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B research article
Can CDM finance energy access in Least Developed
Countries? Evidence from Tanzania
BENJAMIN T. WOOD*, SUSANNAH M. SALLU, JOUNI PAAVOLA
Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK.
Policy documents and academic literature suggest that Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) finance could complement
traditional ‘energy access’ (EA) funding in developing countries, including the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Yet these
propositions have not been empirically tested. This study helps fill this gap by examining constraints to CDM project passage
through five stages of an idealized project development cycle (PDC) in Tanzania, and their implications for the ability of the CDM
to contribute to financing energy access in LDCs. Twenty-five semi-structured interviews and documentary material were ana-
lysed using an analytical framework developed for systematic investigation of constraints. Institutional constraints such as the
under-performance of Tanzania’s Designated National Authority were the most often mentioned obstacles for project develop-
ment. Yet non-institutional constraints such as limited energy sector mitigation potential, indigenous skill shortages, and low
carbon market prices also hinder project development. Institutional constraints buttress, rather than supersede, pre-existing non-
institutional constraints, and together they prevent energy projects from completing the PDC and accessing CDM finance. The
number and severity of constraints suggest that the situation is unlikely to change rapidly, and that the CDM sustains and
exacerbates existing global inequalities. Since traditional energy access funding is insufficient to address these inequalities, new
funding and policy mechanisms are required.
Policy relevance
The CDM fails to fill the EA financing gap in Tanzania. This is also true for other LDCs where comparable project development
challenges prevail. The CDM therefore appears to sustain uneven development patterns overlooking those most in need. Claims
about its potential to enhance EA are misplaced, and the situation is unlikely to change rapidly. CDM and carbon market projects
more widely will have limited ability to help financing EA in LDCs, even if the institutional setting within which they are
implemented were reformed in the future. Yet traditional energy funding will be inadequate on its own. The debate over extending
the CDM post-2017, when the second Kyoto Protocol commitment period expires, should be informed by honest appraisal of its
merits and defects. Policy makers should revisit lessons provided by this article and wider research to help ensure that new EA
mechanisms are not hampered by constraints and can benefit those most in need.
Keywords: Clean Development Mechanism; energy access; Least Developed Countries
1. Introduction
Policy documents and the academic literature suggest that climate finance transfers could complement
traditional ‘energy access’ (EA) funding in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (AEGCC, 2010; AfDB,
2010; Bhattacharyya, 2013; Gujba, Thorne, Mulugetta, Rai, & Sokona, 2012; UNFCCC, 2012; World
Bank, 2013b). Carbon markets, and particularly the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), are
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considered to have potential to do so (AEGCC, 2010; AfDB, 2010; UNFCCC, 2012;World Bank, 2013b),
but little evidence actually exists about this potential. This article contributes to filling this gap by
examining the constraints obstructing CDM finance from being used to enhance EA in Tanzania.
Like other LDCs, Tanzania performs poorly against the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2013a), has low per capita energy usage (World
Bank, 2013a), and is acutely vulnerable to climatic shocks (Abson,Dougill, & Stringer, 2012;Maplecroft
2014). While much research has examined the development contribution of the CDM (Olsen, 2007),
empirical insights from sub-Saharan Africa are scarce. This article expands the evidence base and draws
lessons for future policy making.
No universally accepted EA definition exists (Sokona, Mulugetta, & Gujba, 2012). Here, it is defined
as the ability to obtain adequate, clean, reliable, and affordable energy services to fulfil basic needs and
enable productive usage (AEGCC, 2010). Energy services encompass electricity, fuels, and technologies
for cooking and heating, andmechanical power (AEGCC, 2010). EA is crucial for fulfilling basic human
needs such as health, education, communication, transport, and food security (Hailu, 2012; Sanchez,
2010). Yet over two billion people are without it (IEA, 2013). It can also reduce poverty by enabling pro-
ductive activities (Hailu, 2012). EA is thus integral to human development, helping people to expand
their freedoms and realize their capabilities (Sen, 2001). Countries’ HDI performance is strongly corre-
lated to per capita energy use (Sager, Oliver, & Chikkatur, 2006).
However, national and international energy policy discourses overlook EA, and a financing gap
undermines its enhancement (Sanchez, 2010). Autonomous EA transitions can occur when the
average daily income of people exceeds US$3 (Sanchez, 2010). Yet, many living without EA earn less
than $1.25 per day (UNDP, 2013b). Energy poverty also prevents income growth (Glemarec, 2012).
Enhancing EA thus requires the provision of financial assistance, yet those in energy poverty cannot
command scarce public resources (EAC, 2008; Eberhard& Shkaratan, 2012). ForeignDirect Investment
and development finance often bypass nations with the poorest EA (Gualberti, Bazilian, Haites, & de
Graca Cravalho, 2012). The global economic downturn and donor apathy also undermine EA finan-
cing (Bhattacharyya, 2013; Glemarec, 2012). An injection of carbon market finance would therefore
be welcome.
CDM aims to encourage sustainable development in developing nations and assist industrialized
nations to achieve cost-effective emissions reductions (UNFCCC, 2013a). Project developers access
CDM finance by selling Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) to buyers in industrialized nations
(Grubb, 2003). Projects must complete the CDM project development cycle (PDC) to attain CERs
(UNFCCC, 2013e). CDM is not a silver bullet for EA financing, but several CDM projects have provided
low-emission energy to host communities (UNFCCC, 2013f).
Developing nations generate a negligible fraction of global GHG emissions (EIA, 2012), but low-
emission EA provision could yield development co-benefits. Increased trade and investment could
foster economic growth (Sokona et al., 2012) while reducing the financial and political instability
caused by volatile fossil fuel prices (Agbemabiese, Nkomo, & Sokona, 2012). Moving away from
biomass consumption, an energy staple of the poor, would reduce health risks, particularly for
women and children (Felix & Gheewala, 2011). Low-emission EA would reduce lock-in to emissions-
intensive technologies, helping reduce the magnitude of future climate change (Gujba et al., 2012;
Sokona et al., 2012). Championing low-emissions planning could imbue developing nations’ calls
for developed nations to reduce their emissions with enhanced moral weight (AfDB, 2008).
2 Wood et al.
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EA also has the potential to generate climate adaptation benefits. Coping with climatic risks is
related to the abilities of people to fulfil basic needs (Eakin, Tompkins, Nelson, & Anderies,
2009), so improved EA could enhance adaptive capacity. Reduced biomass consumption would
curtail deforestation and forest degradation, safeguarding important safety nets provided by
forest resources (Hosonuma et al., 2012). Improved EA can also enable livelihood diversification
and enhance people’s productivity and income. EA transitions could thus enhance long-term
climate resilience.
CDM-financed energy projectsmight therefore simultaneously foster development,mitigation, and
adaptation efforts and be consistent with the notion of Climate-Compatible Development (CCD),
which seeks to realize such ‘triple-wins’ (Mitchell and Maxwell, 2010). These projects are referred to
in the following as ‘climate-compatible energy access’ (CCEA). Despite their triple-win potential,
most CDM–CCEA projects are located in middle-income countries such as China, Brazil, and India
rather than LDCs (UNEP-Risoe, 2013d).
Constraints to project development, which prevent access to CDM finance, differ among LDCs, but
often include institutional constraints such as budgetary restrictions (Byigero, Clancy, & Skutsch,
2010), poor quality of regulation, and corruption (De Lopez, Tim, Iyadomi, Santos, & McIntosh, 2009;
Sieghart, 2009). Common constraints also include underdeveloped private sectors (De Lopez et al.,
2009), skills shortages (Sieghart, 2009),high transactioncosts (Dhakal&Raut, 2010), poor access tofinan-
cial products (Sieghart, 2009), limited local CDMawareness and experience, and lack of community buy-
in (Gilau,VanBuskirk,&Small, 2007)because local benefits are absent (Mathur,Afionis, Paavola,Dougill,
& Stringer, 2014).
High investment returns could alleviate the above-identified constraints. However, households and
small businesses dominate LDCs’ energy consumption. Together with underdeveloped industrial
sectors this translates to low energy-sector emissions and mitigation potential (De Lopez et al.,
2009). This reduces profitable project development opportunities (Jung, 2006). Low CER prices after
the global carbon market price crash (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012) have exacerbated the problem. While
opportunities for non-industrial, decentralized projects may still exist, high set-up costs make them
hard to implement (Lewis, 2010). Yet the majority of LDC populations (UNFPA, 2011) live in hard-
to-reach rural areas where decentralized projects are required to enhance EA.
Constraints of varying severity thus appear to frustrate CDM–CCEA project development in
LDCs. Some constraints, such as low CDM awareness, seem more surmountable than others,
such as insufficient mitigation potential. Concerns about inequitable global project distribution
have led to CDM reforms such as ‘bundling’ and Programmes of Activities (UNFCCC, 2013b).
UN-led CDM support programmes have also aimed to encourage project development (UNEP-
Risoe, 2013b).
To date, CDM research has focused on a few types of constraint (e.g. economic, institutional, and
technical constraints) and overlooked others (e.g. social and environmental constraints). Research
has not examined whether the constraints together conspire to prevent project development and
access to CDM finance. Addressing these literature gaps would enhance understanding of the con-
straints and aid practical interventions to overcome them. This article therefore examines constraints
and their interactions to understand how they occur and vary in the different PDC stages and whether
they influence the CDM’s ability to help finance energy access.
Can CDM finance energy access in LDCs? 3
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In what follows, we outline a framework for the systematic analysis of the constraints obstructing
CDM–CCEA project development. Constraints in Tanzania are examined using this framework. Find-
ings are presented and discussed in relation to debates on the CDM, EA, and development, before con-
clusions and policy implications are drawn.
2. Case study, materials, and methods
2.1. Research context
Tanzania was selected as a case study for several reasons. In 2002 it ratified the Kyoto Protocol and is
eligible for hosting CDM projects (UNFCCC, 2013c). Tanzanian GHG emissions were 0.02% of the
global total in 2010 (EIA, 2012), but it is acutely vulnerable to climate impacts (Abson et al., 2012;
Maplecroft, 2014). Most Tanzanians are also without EA (REA, No date) and face stark development
challenges (UNDP, 2013a).
An Executive Board supervises the CDM and authorizes project registration (UNFCCC, 2013d). It
operates under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). A Tanzanian Designated National Authority (DNA) assesses
proposed projects against the country’s Sustainability Criteria. DNAs should also build awareness
about theCDMand coordinate national stakeholders (UNFCCC, 2013d). TheDivision of Environment
within the Vice President’s Office hosts Tanzania’s DNA. It is assisted by a Steering Committee consist-
ing of representatives of various Government Departments (DoE, 2007).
To achieve CERs, CDM projects must progress through PDC stages. A review of CDM governance lit-
erature (e.g. DoE, 2007; UNFCCC, 2013e) and interviews with Project Developers and Consultants
suggest that five key stages can be distinguished:
B Project identification. Technical feasibility studies, profitability analyses, and other considerations
help to determine project development opportunities. A Project Idea Note is produced to describe
the planned project and its likely mitigation and sustainable development benefits. These must be
‘additional’ to business-as-usual scenarios.
B Project design. Project developers choosemethodologies for determining project emission baselines
and reductions, complete detailed Project Design Documents, and conduct stakeholder consul-
tation with those affected by or interested in the project. Revised Project Design Documents
must address stakeholder concerns.
B Validation, approval and registration. Projects are validated byDesignatedOperational Entities (inde-
pendent third parties that evaluate projects against CDM regulations) before DNA approval and
Executive Board registration.
B Implementation. Projects are implemented to achieve the objectives set out in the Project IdeaNotes
and Design Documents.
B Monitoring and verification. Emissions reductions are monitored using approved methodologies.
DesignatedOperational Entities verify reductions andnotify the Executive Board,which issuesCERs.
The ‘Mtoni Dumpsite’ landfill gas recovery project – established in 2007 inDar es Salaam to improve
national electricity supply reliability – is the only Tanzanian CDM project to have ever received CERs
4 Wood et al.
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(1612 kCERs) (UNEP-Risoe, 2013d). Several other projects are currently progressing through the PDC
stages. The Tanzanian Rural Energy Agency registered a Programme of Activities to enhance EA in
May 2014 (UNFCCC, 2014). Further CDM projects involving biomass, hydro-electricity, biogas,
energy efficiency, and wind and solar energy have been started but not completed (UNEP-Risoe,
2013c). Domestic and foreign actors including national, regional, and supranational governance per-
sonnel, NGOs and trade association employees, consultants, low-emissions energy technology distri-
butors and project developers have been involved in the initiatives (UNEP-Risoe, 2013d). This project
landscape suggests that project development challenges do exist and that the country offers a good case
study for research.
2.2. Material collection and analysis
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 25 stakeholder representatives (Table 1) in June 2013.
They were identified using a snowball sampling approach (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). Information from
UNEP-Risoe (2013a, 2013c) helped identify project developers as initial interviewees. They rec-
ommended wider stakeholders who were contacted for interview to expand the number and variety
of respondents. Interviewees were asked about their involvement in CDM–CCEA projects and their
experiences with project passage through PDC stages. Difficulties they had faced were probed. Inter-
views were recorded and transcribed.
The following documentarymaterial was also collected and analysed: twoGovernment policy docu-
ments (VPO, 2007, 2012), three Acts of Parliament (GoT, 2003, 2004, 2005), three documents detailing
the content of UNEP-Risoe CDM support workshops (CEEST, 2007; Manyika, 2007; Muyungi, 2007),
and the Government-produced Handbook for CDM Activities in Tanzania (DoE, 2007). The documents
discuss CDM project development or contain information affecting the process.
A framework was developed to identify and analyse project development constraints in interview
transcripts and documentary material (Figure 1). Moser and Ekstrom’s (2010) approach for identifying
constraints obstructing climate adaptation was used as a starting point. The framework focuses on
project developers’ capabilities to progress projects through PDC stages. Although in reality PDC pro-
gression may be messy and iterative, the framework facilitates linear analysis for convenience and
Table 1 Interviewees categorized by stakeholder group
Stakeholder group Number of interviewees
Project Developer 7
Consultant 2
Low-emissions Energy Technology Distributors 4
National Government 3
Supranational Governance Organization 3
NGO 3
Trade Association 2
Donor Agency 1
Can CDM finance energy access in LDCs? 5
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clarity (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010). The framework aims to be both actor-centric and context-aware.
Three interconnected factors shape CDM–CCEA project progression: project developers themselves,
the social-ecological system upon which they act, and the larger governance context. Characteristics
of, and interactions between, these elements determine the presence of constraints and reasons for
their occurrence.
Evidence of constraints was identified using open coding. Constraints were categorized according to
the PDC stage at which they occurred. An inductive approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) was used to
group constraints according to their ‘types’ within PDC stages and establish contextual factors
shaping their presence. Constant comparison techniques (Babbie, 2008) allowed interconnections
between constraints to be established and themes arising from particular data sources to be validated.
This process was continued until ‘theoretical saturation’ was achieved (Flick, 2009, p. 312).
Figure 1 A diagnostic framework to guide the identification and analysis of possible constraints to
CDM–CCEA project development
Notes: Blue arrows denote progression through PDC stages. Black arrows signpost the two-way
relationship between project development and contextual factors.
6 Wood et al.
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3. Results
Institutional, economic, environmental, informational, technical, and social constraints to CDM–
CCEA project development were identified in data analysis. Constraints were considered obstructive
in their own right but were also linked to other constraints operating across the PDC. The most inhi-
bitive constraints are discussed in the following in the order of the PDC stages. For confidentiality,
interviewees are left anonymous. Only the stakeholder groups that interviewees represent are
documented.
3.1. Project identification and design
Five interviewees suggested that project development opportunities are curtailed by limited industrial
activity, dependence on kerosene and biomass, and low energy consumption. These translate to low
GHG emissions from Tanzania’s energy sector. Project development is viable only in areas where
energy production and consumption levels are comparatively high. One consultant highlighted
that Tanzania’s sole accredited CDM project – the Mtoni Dumpsite project – is based in Dar es
Salaam. EA is better there than elsewhere in the country, and large volumes of emissions-generating
city waste are produced.
Low and unpredictable CER prices havemade it hard to identify financially viable projects and com-
plicate projects already under development. Half the interviewees identified CER prices as a constraint
to project development but recognized that most other constraints outlined in this section predated
the carbon market crash. A project developer considered that ‘the CDM was already dead prior to
the crash’.
Seven interviewees stated that limited experience undermines Government assistance with project
identification and design. They considered mitigation to be poorly understood by Government offi-
cials. OneGovernment and oneNGOemployee suggested that ‘constantly changing’ CDM regulations
and novelty of CDMpolicy designwere a compounding factor. OneGovernment employee considered
CDM the first market-based environmental policy instrument in Tanzania.
National climate action focuses almost exclusively on adaptation in Tanzania. TheNational Climate
Change Strategy (VPO, 2012) frames CDM–CCEA projects as mitigation exercises, overlooking their
potential development and adaptation benefits (VPO, 2012). CDM is not mentioned in Tanzania’s
National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) (VPO, 2007). Failure to acknowledge their wider
benefits may help explain low Government prioritization of CDM–CCEA projects.
Negative perceptions of the CDM among politicians and officials form a constraint to project devel-
opment at the beginning of the PDC. Five interviewees, including two Government representatives,
attributed this to low energy-sector emissions and carbon prices, which restrict project potential.
Non-government interviewees also believed the Mtoni Dumpsite project underperformance to be a
contributing factor.
A consultant, whohas advised on theCDMacross Africa, suggested that negative perceptions should
be considered against Tanzania’s colonial past as well as global trade relations unfavourable to Africa.
He talked of concerns that ‘foreign CDM project developers might buy vast tracts of land and under-
mine Tanzania’s struggle for independence’. Minutes of a UN-led CDM support workshop corroborate
the view, with one participant worried that projects can be ‘lost to wazungu (white foreigners)’ (CEEST,
Can CDM finance energy access in LDCs? 7
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2007). Three non-government interviewees also suggested that Government employees regard
biomass energy unfavourably as the ‘poor man’s fuel’.
A project developer and an NGO employee considered that limited Government enthusiasm con-
tributes to coordination and governance problemswithin and across levels. It was seen to have contrib-
uted to a negative investment climate, which deters external CDM project investment. Curtailed
enthusiasm was also considered to explain the Government’s reluctance to commit resources to
streamline CDM approval processes. Half of the interviewees considered CDM institutional and
policy frameworks to be inadequate, and the roles and responsibilities for developing, implementing,
and approving projects unclear. A supranational governance organization employee considered DNA
to be built on unstructured, opaque, and ‘ad-hoc’ processes.
Despite these ambiguities, significant domestic involvement was considered necessary for DNA
approval. TheHandbook for CDMActivities in Tanzania states simply that ‘there should be a partnership
between the investor country company or institution and the host country local private company,
NGO, research institution or Government department’ (DoE, 2007, p. 14). Yet four non-government
interviewees considered that projects must be over 51% domestically owned to be approved. One Gov-
ernment employee denied this. Another stressed that ‘local involvement must be reasonable’. Regard-
less, the necessity for domestic involvement was considered by half the interviewees to have restricted
project passage through the first and second PDC stages.
Nine interviewees reported that domestic technical skill shortages constrain the preparation ofCDM
documentation and the development of methodologies for measuring emissions reductions. Five
respondents considered these tasks to be complicated by poor baseline data. Additional non-insti-
tutional constraints have hindered domestic ability to identify and capitalize on CDM opportunities.
According to 10 interviewees, awareness of CDM and renewable energy solutions remains limited in
Tanzania. An underdeveloped private sector, inexperience in dealing with market-based policy instru-
ments, perceived slow pace of business, and lack of entrepreneurial spirit were also considered con-
straints. A disconnect exists between conditions on the ground and the domestic involvement
requirement.
A UN-led CDM support programme sought to build domestic CDM capacity via stakeholder work-
shops (2006–2009). Three interviewees regarded it as a fruitful exercise, but one consultant considered
that ‘the workshops only involved a limited number of people’. A supranational governance organiz-
ation employee believed the Government had overlooked lessons that had emerged.
Three interviewees believed that limited domestic expertise has increased the dependence on exter-
nal consultants, accountants, and auditors. This has raised the transaction costs of regulatory compli-
ance, with interviewees estimating these costs to total up to $200,000 per project across the PDC.
According to 11 interviewees, the funds cannot be sourced from domestic banks. Despite UN efforts
to train financial institutions about CDM opportunities, banks were considered to be uninformed
about, and wary of supporting, climate investments. CDM complexity and delays on investment
returns caused by other constraints compound this wariness, according to two respondents. Tanzanian
banks charge very high interest rates (up to 16% for loans of under five years). This was regarded as
incompatible with CDM–CCEA project financing requirements.
Tanzania’s Electricity SupplyCompany (TANESCO) is responsible for paying for electricity generated
by grid-connected projects, but three project developers suggested that it regularly fails to fulfil its obli-
gations. Negative bank perceptions about TANESCO’s credibility as an end-client have further
8 Wood et al.
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restricted finance for affected projects. Poor access to finance and long investment return periods are
also problematic for project developers. One project developer said that when working on CDM pro-
jects he ‘worries about what I will eat tomorrow’. He stated that the UNDP will provide developer
loans of up to $250,000 to cover upfront costs, but this funding is not accessible before the DNA has
approved projects. This approval is difficult to obtain.
3.2. Validation, approval, and registration
Most Tanzanian CDM–CCEA projects fail at the Validation, Approval and Registration stage, yet
reasons for this are unclear. According to one project developer, ‘Projects are blocked for no reasons.
You are just stuck’. Two interviewees indicated that the aforementioned unstructured, ad hoc, and
opaque CDM decision-making processes, and the vagueness of Tanzania’s Sustainability Criteria,
make the identification of the reasons for project failure very difficult.
Respondents widely considered DNA project approval near impossible to attain. The approval
process is characterized by delays and poor communication. Over half the interviewees perceived
the DNA to be unresponsive. Accordingly, projects end up getting a de facto non-approval for unspeci-
fied reasons. Frustration about the situation also exists in the DNA’s office, but different views prevail
over why gaining approval is so difficult.
Six interviewees, including a Government official, cited insufficient DNA staffing and resources as
key explanatory factors. Another Government official suggested the same in a UN-led CDM support
workshop presentation (Manyika, 2007). Several interviewees reported that international and dom-
estic actors regularly complain to Government organizations about DNA underperformance. Contin-
ued complaints about the DNA fall upon deaf ears: indeed, a trade association employee felt ‘powerless
to create change’. According to one donor agency employee, DNA underperformance has led most
agencies to advise international investors to avoid Tanzania.
Some project developers suggested ‘corruption in the DNA’ as another cause for its underperfor-
mance. One said ‘staff are also CDM consultants and therefore have vested interests in seeing
certain projects succeed and others fail’. Another, who has developed CDM projects in many non-
industrialized nations, described the DNA as ‘themost corrupt in Africa’. A third suggested ‘corruption
is a continental norm’. Yet two project developers and a consultant considered that non-approvals are
down to theDNA’s gatekeeper role: projects are blocked for failing tomeet Tanzania’s CDMSustainabil-
ity Criteria. An NGO employee explained that although ‘the DNA is seen as “Mr Bad Guy” who stran-
gles Tanzania’ by blocking projects, its staff members work to protect citizens from harm. The same
interviewee stated that Africa attracts profit-seeking ‘carbon cowboys’ who look to develop projects
without regard for host communities.
3.3. Project implementation and monitoring and verification
Insufficient consumer demand was seen to constrain project implementation. While Tanzania’s elec-
tricity grid experiences supply problems, demand for off-grid electricity projects is curtailed by low dis-
posable incomes and low-cost biomass abundance. Even CDM-subsidized CCEA solutions are
prohibitively expensive for most local people. Interviewees mentioned that demand is further con-
strained by concerns about imported technology and associated job losses, low education and aware-
ness about project benefits, and negative past experiences with energy products. Such factors weaken
Can CDM finance energy access in LDCs? 9
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community buy-in, which has hampered project developers’ ability to stimulate emission reductions
andmake projects commercially viable. One project developer said project design changes introduced
after initial stakeholder consultation often exacerbate disillusionment.
Few energy solutions were regarded to address local peoples’ energy needs comprehensively. For
example, electricity solutions provide lighting butmaynot fulfil cooking andproductive usage require-
ments. Thus, local people are reluctant to spendmoney that could be used to purchase vital goods and
services, such as food, clothing, and children’s education. According to one energy technology distri-
butor, ‘solar provides light but does not cook food or give children clothes. It is complicated.’
Five interviewees suggested that domestic skill shortages restrict the manufacture, installation, and
maintenance of required energy technologies, as well as project monitoring and verification. Skills
shortages are most acute for decentralized rural projects. Despite Government efforts to encourage
low-carbon energy generation by reducing renewable technology import duties, foreign exchange
costs of importing products have increased implementation costs. Hiring external consultants for
monitoring and verification further increases project development costs. TANESCO’s inadequate
tariffs, its unwillingness to assist with grid-infrastructure costs, and failures to pay project developers
are also seen to burden grid-connected projects.
Our results are subject to the limitations of snowball sampling, which does not always yield repre-
sentative output (Heckathorn, 2011). Here, it led to less representation for some stakeholder groups
(e.g. Government, Donor Agencies) compared with others (e.g. Project Developers). Low Government
representation may explain why institutional constraints were most frequently cited.
4. Discussion
The methodological approach developed and used in this article has enabled a comprehensive diag-
nosis of constraints to CDM–CCEA project development operating across the PDC. By incorporat-
ing contextual factors, the framework has fostered an understanding of why constraints occur and
has captured their consequences, relative severity, and interconnections. Its use focused data collec-
tion efforts and allowed for comparison and amalgamation of data gathered from dissimilar sources.
In the following we discuss our results with reference to wider debates on the CDM, EA, and devel-
opment. Evidence suggests that the constraints facing Tanzania are also common for other LDCs. By
contrast, higher-income developing countries have fewer constraints. It is therefore unsurprising
that these countries have been the primary beneficiaries of CDM–CCEA projects to date (UNEP-
Risoe, 2013d).
Institutional constraints arewidespread in Tanzania, and include low levels of staffing, weak budget-
ary capacity, and alleged corruption within the DNA. These constraints are linked to the consequences
of other institutional constraints operating at earlier PDC stages. Their combined impacts have pre-
vented project progression. Changing and complex CDM regulations appear an important, but less
acute, institutional constraint.
The literature emphasizes the importance of a well-functioning DNA for successful CDM project
development (Byigero et al., 2010; Jung, 2006). The Tanzanian DNA was seen to have failed to meet
the three key requirements for a DNA described byWinkler’s, Davidson, &Mwakasonda (2005): invest-
ment promotion, administrative support, and the creation of clear approval (including National
10 Wood et al.
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Sustainability) criteria. This has had implications for non-institutional constraints, with poor DNA
functioning linked to low baseline information availability, which has hindered project design.
Inadequate DNA staffing and financial capacity is also problematic in Rwanda, Uganda, andMalawi
(Byigero et al., 2010; Stringer et al., 2012). By contrast, well-defined and engaged institutions, adequate
capacity, and smooth approval procedures underpin the success of China, India, and South Africa in
attracting CDM projects (Byigero et al., 2010; Phillips & Newell, 2013; Teng & Zhang, 2010). China
and India rank first and second in terms of CERs accrued (UNEP-Risoe, 2013d). South Africa has
received by far themost CERs in Africa (Byigero et al., 2010). However, difficult and protracted approval
should not be constructed as a proxy for institutional weakness. In Brazil, stringent and sometimes
cumbersome DNA processes are part of a rigorous scrutiny of National Sustainability criteria
(UNIDO, 2003). The prioritization of investment over sustainable development can mean CDM pro-
jects fail to benefit host communities (Hultman, 2009). Commendable scrutiny may result in the
non-approval of some projects. Yet in Tanzania and other LDCs, other issues are clearly involved.
Non-institutional constraints operating across the PDC also restrict CDM–CCEA project develop-
ment. Low EA in Tanzania translates to a very limited energy sector mitigation potential, which in
turn prevents projects from generating sufficient CERs to make them commercially viable. This has
reportedly thwarted the majority of projects and has unevenly distributed project potential within
the country. Low non-sink mitigation potential is challenging for the majority of countries eligible
for CDM investment, including all African nations except South Africa (Jung, 2006). Globally,
energy-sector CDM projects are often overlooked in favour of industrial gas capture projects, which
yield greater commercial returns for mitigating GHGs with high radiative forcing values (Wara, 2007).
Significant indigenous involvement is considerednecessary for project approval in Tanzania. Similar
requirements exist elsewhere, including in China (Schroeder, 2009). Unlike in China, however, iden-
tifying and capitalizing on latent Tanzanian CDM–CCEA project development opportunities is under-
mined by indigenous skill shortages, low awareness of low-carbon energy solutions and policy, a slow
pace of business, and limited entrepreneurial spirit. Low consumer demand also restricts project
implementation. Ahlborg and Hammar (2012) identified these constraints when analysing the poten-
tial for renewable energy rollout in Tanzania. They hamper CCEA project development in other lower-
income developing countries, both when project funding involves CDM finance and when it does not
(Simon, Bumpus, & Mann, 2012).
The CER price collapse was identified as the nail in the coffin for CDM–CCEA project development
in Tanzania. Thiswas caused by global economic volatility and chronic oversupply in the global carbon
market’s ‘engine’, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012, p. 9). Prices have
slumped to under E1 (Point Carbon, 2012), and only projects with very high mitigation potential
are now viable. This has diminished project development opportunities worldwide, including in
China (Teng & Zhang, 2010).
Nonetheless, the aforementioned constraints predated the carbon market crash and were already
hindering LDC project development. Their presence also contributes to financial obstacles. For
example, in Tanzania, indigenous skill shortages require external assistance, which significantly
increases transaction costs. The absence of domestic manufacturing capacity also inflates import
costs (Painuly & Fenhann, 2002). Even before the carbon market crash, CDM finance increased the
rates of return only marginally, and projects needed to be near to financial closure without CDM to
be viable (Schroeder, 2009). LDCs suffer from heightened project development costs, poor investment
Can CDM finance energy access in LDCs? 11
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climates, and inadequate access to financial products (De Lopez et al., 2009; Sieghart, 2009). Nearing
financial closure is therefore more testing than in higher-income developing countries.
The size and type of a project makes little difference in Tanzania to its viability, which contradicts
research findings in other LDCs (Beck & Martinot, 2004; Lewis, 2010). While constraints may differ
depending on a project’s characteristics, the difficulties of dealingwith TANESCO andnavigating infra-
structural weakness mean that the obstructions reported for large, grid-connected projects were just as
significant as those for small-scale, decentralized technologies.
Despite themore common identification of institutional constraints by interviewees and documen-
tary material, environmental, technical, social, and economic constraints play an equally important
role in hindering project development. Resolving the institutional constraints would not be sufficient
for the CDM to enhance EA in Tanzania and other LDCs. Institutional constraints have merely but-
tressed pre-existing non-institutional constraints. Together, they have – to all practical purposes –
halted CDM–CCEA project development. These findings explain the scarcity of Tanzanian voluntary
carbonmarket projects (Markit, 2013), which do not require DNA approval, often benefit from flexible
regulation (Schroeder, 2009), and are less exposed to institutional constraints.
Institutional and non-institutional constraintsmay bemutually reinforcing in LDCs. Curtailed Tan-
zanian Government enthusiasm for CDM projects is linked to a lack of project opportunities. This res-
onates with the conclusions of Byigero et al. (2010), who found that well-functioning institutional
arrangements are only found in countries that benefit from project development opportunities and
that are able to exploit them. An absence of the latter makes governments less willing to invest
scarce resources in CDM institutional frameworks, in what is a ‘chicken-and-egg’ situation (Byigero
et al., 2010, p. 188). This could explain why Tanzania’s Government has so far ignored stakeholders’
demands for wholesale DNA reform: it appears a rational response given the likely limited payback.
However, limitedGovernment enthusiasm isnot only a result of the lack of project opportunities. Tan-
zanian energypolicy and legislationacknowledge thatmost of thepopulationwill dependonbiomass for
the foreseeable future. However, policy instruments for encouraging interventions (e.g. improved cook-
stoves), which can help biomass consumption better meet people’s energy needs, are absent (GoT 2003,
2005). Instead, transitions towards ‘modern energy’ technologies are emphasized. This may be because
public authorities have a low regard for biomass.Negativeperceptionand a lack of enabling environment
are commonacross sub-SaharanAfrica, underminingbiomass energy sectors (Owen,vander Plas,&Sepp,
2013). DNA non-approval for CDM biomass projects may also be linked to negative perceptions.
The UN-led CDM support programme in Tanzania – established to facilitate project development –
focused narrowly on DNA capacity-building, awareness-raising among financial institutions, and
enhancing selected potential project developers’ technical expertise by educating them about CDM
administration. Tanzania has received 6.6% of all capacity-building funding allocated to Africa and
LDCs (much more than most other eligible nations) (Okubo & Michaelowa, 2010), but the activities
have failed to address constraints to CDM–CCEA project development.
Byigero et al. (2010) and Okubo and Michaelowa (2010) have identified similar patterns in support
activities across LDCs. The former consider support programmes to be politically motivated, initiated
merely to show that ‘something is being done’ to assist countries that CDM has not benefited. Pro-
grammes of Activities and ‘bundling’ reforms are yet to deliver in Tanzania. Interviewees largely wel-
comed them, but they have been insufficient to kick-start project development. Whether the
12 Wood et al.
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Programme of Activities registered in May 2014 by the Tanzanian Renewable Energy Agency can
counter this trend remains to be seen.
5. Conclusion and policy implications
A poor ‘fit’ between policy design, UN-led support programmes, and Least Developed Country (LDC)
implementation contexts means that Clean Development Mechanism– climate-compatible energy
access (CDM–CCEA) beneficiaries tend to be higher-income developing countries (UNEP-Risoe,
2013d). These countries also receive traditional energy access (EA) funding (Bhattacharyya, 2013).
The CDM values cost-effective CER generation potential, supportive business environments, and indi-
genous project development capacity (Niederberger & Saner, 2005), and is implemented across the
developing world as a ‘panaceum’. Research reported in this article found that several institutional,
economic, environmental, informational, technical, and social constraints operate across PDC
stages in Tanzania and create conditions counter to those valued by CDM.
Institutional constraints, including DNA underperformance, are important, but non-institutional
constraints also restrict project development. Low energy-sector mitigation potential, indigenous
skills shortages, and slumped carbon prices are particularly problematic. Institutional constraints
have merely buttressed pre-existing non-institutional constraints. Together they have, to all practical
purposes, halted CDM–CCEA project development. Constraints are also often found in other LDCs. It
is therefore unsurprising that CDM–CCEA projects are more plentiful in higher-income developing
nations, which face less onerous constraints.
Should commercially viable project development opportunities arise in LDCs, they must still
compete with the ‘low-hanging fruit’ (Newell, 2012, p. 252) offered by CCEA and non-CCEA projects
elsewhere. Non-LDC projects often benefit from superior initial conditions and are rationally priori-
tized by investors engaging in CDM’s ‘race to the bottom’ (Newell, 2012, p. 251). Developmental pro-
blems underpinning constraints see countries classified as ‘LDCs’ in the first instance (UN, 2011).
Accordingly, the CDM creates something of a paradox, whereby problems that CCEA investment
could help solve also prevent its attainment.
The CDM is exacerbating, rather than reducing, global inequalities. Although the global commons
may benefit from CDMmitigation in higher-income developing nations, the development and adap-
tation benefits of CCEA bypass LDC populations. Because many constraints predated the CDM in Tan-
zania, it is questionable whether it was ever adequately configured to finance EA there. Claims about
CDM potential to enhance EA in LDCs are misplaced, and the situation is unlikely to change rapidly.
Targeting and overcoming the many onerous constraints would be challenging and complex.
Although structural CDM reform has been discussed extensively, research suggests that proposed
market-based options would fail to encourage project development in LDCs while underlying con-
straints persist. Replacing the current project focus with a sectoral CDM or creating preferential LDC
access measures would be unlikely to yield benefits (Castro & Michaelowa, 2010; Murphy, Cosbey, &
Drexhage, 2008). Given the low mitigation potential, neither is it clear that grants and loans for
LDC project developers to ease the financial burden of constraints (HLPCD, 2012) would sufficiently
incentivize action. We therefore conclude that the CDM and carbon market projects more widely
have only limited ability to help finance LDC EA.
Can CDM finance energy access in LDCs? 13
CLIMATE POLICY
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
ee
ds
] a
t 0
8:2
0 0
3 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
5 
The situation might change if the CDM were reformed to value sustainable development and/or
adaptation benefits. However, this change would undermine its mitigation impact. In turn, it could
reduce motivation for emissions-reduction within the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) more widely. This is because the CDM plays a key political role in
uniting developed and developing countries behind future climate action (HLPCD, 2012). A fund-
based CDM could make project distribution more equitable and overcome low carbon prices. Yet
this would also be unlikely to generate the levels of finance required to enhance LDC EA and
advance other mitigation activities (Murphy et al., 2008). Future generations in LDCs would be most
detrimentally impacted should emissions-reduction efforts dwindle.
If CDM remains a market-based mechanism, then the misplaced claims of policy makers about its
potential to enhance LDC EA must end. The debate over extending the CDM post-2017, when the
second Kyoto Protocol commitment period expires, should be informed by honest appraisal of its
merits and defects. Acknowledgement of the CDM’s shortcomings could create leverage for
UNFCCC fund-based mechanisms, such as the Adaptation Fund and Least Developed Countries
Fund, to play an immediate compensatory role. The Green Climate Fund could also provide assistance
in the longer term. However, new and innovative funding and policy mechanisms are also required to
overcome traditional EA funding shortages. If policies encourage CCEA, they should be informed by
empirical social justice analyses of projects past and present, since the justice implications of pursuing
development, mitigation and adaptation for host populations are not yet clear. Policy makers should
revisit lessons provided by this article and wider research to help ensure that newmechanisms are not
hampered by constraints and can benefit those most in need.
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